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Abstract 
 
The global effort to eradicate polio began in 1988. The target of the effort was to eradicate the 
disease by the year 2000, a target which was not attained. The annual number of polio cases 
has been reduced from 350,000 in 1988, to 650 in 2011. Research shows that financial 
setbacks are the main reason why polio has not yet been eradicated. When donor countries 
contribute less than the needed amount to eradicate, they signal that this effort is not in their 
interest. Cost-benefit analysis demonstrates that the high short term costs involved in the 
eradication effort are outweighed by the long term benefits of not needing to vaccinate the 
population. So why has polio not been eradicated? Studies show that even though a country 
would benefit from increasing its contribution, it will not do so unless other countries do the 
same.  
 
Using an experimental approach we have investigated how the level of contributions differs 
under two conditions: if contributions are made on behalf of one donor country or on behalf 
of the whole group of donor countries. We have also tested to see if information emphasizing 
the benefits of eradication will increase contributions. The results show a weak difference 
between contributions made when playing the role as the policy maker for a country 
compared to contributions made when playing the same role for the whole group. Information 
did not have an effect on the performance. The experimental group was made up of students 
playing the role of policy makers. The make-up of the experimental group may have affected 
the results of the experiment. Students may have a better understanding of long term benefits 
and base their decisions on different incentives than policy makers, resulting in the weak 
difference of treatments. However, there may also be misperceptions of long term benefits 
which need different corrections than written information can give.  
 
Keywords: Polio, eradication, game theory, system dynamics, free-riding, short term, costs, 
long term, benefits. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The feasibility of eradicating infectious diseases has made WHO start several global 
eradication programs. Smallpox was eradicated in 1979 after setting the eradication goal in 
the 1950’s (Fenner et. al., 1988). In 1988, the World Health Assembly (1988) declared that 
polio would be the next disease in line to be eradicated with a goal by the year 2000.  Polio is 
a vaccine preventable eradicable infectious disease which in 1 in 200 infecteds leads to 
irreversible paralysis (WHO, April 2013).  To coordinate the effort from external donors, the 
Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) was launched in 1988 as a “public-private 
partnership led by national governments and spearheaded by the World Health Organization 
(WHO), Rotary International, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and 
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)” (GPEI, 2014a). Since 1988, the number of 
annually paralytic polio cases has been reduced from 350,000 to 650 cases in 2011 (CDC 
2012; GPEI 2009). Polio has been eliminated from all but 3 countries; Afghanistan, Nigeria 
and Pakistan (CDC, 2012). Eradication requires elimination in every country at the same time 
(Thompson & Tebbens, 2007). Once eradicated, polio will never reemerge and vaccination 
can there cease. In a long-term perspective, the investment of eradication will give a 
tremendous return in forms of avoided vaccination costs (Barrett, 2004).  
 
The polio eradication goal was not met in 2000. As a consequence, a new goal of zero wild 
polio transmission by 2005 was set, but never met. The present goal of no wild poliovirus by 
the end of 2014 is also likely to unattainable (GPEI, 2013b; 2014b; WHO, 2003). Political 
instability and poor vaccination efficacy explains this delay in some extent, but financial 
shortfalls is seen to be the “primary risk” to eradication failure (Barrett, 2013). Even though 
there are only a few endemic countries, low vaccination rates due to funding shortage makes 
non-endemic countries vulnerable for outbreak because of the risk of poliovirus importation. 
For example, the outbreak of polio in previously polio-free African and Asian countries in 
2004-2006, caused by financial shortfalls, resulted in spending $400 million to once again 
eliminate polio in these countries (Thompson & Tebbens, 2007). The original eradication 
costs set in 1988 was 1 billion dollar, but from 1988-2013, 9 billion dollars has been used on 
eradication efforts (GPEI, 2012; Pirio & Kaufmann, 2010).  
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Eradication is a high risk and costly goal, making some researchers questioning the cost-
effectiveness of such policies (Arita et. al., 2006). With the doubt of eradication as a starting 
point, Thompson and Tebbens (2007) compared control and eradication strategies concerning 
polio. They found that in spite of the high cost, the long term benefits of not needing any 
more vaccination makes eradication worth it (Thompson & Tebbens, 2007).  Findings made 
by Barrett (2004) states that when eradication of any infectious diseases is feasible, 
controlling the epidemic on a certain level is not optimal compared to eradication. The global 
benefit of eradication was in 2010 estimated to 40-50 billion dollars (GPEI, 2011). 
 
Polio eradication requires international financing since development countries have 
insufficient budget to eliminate polio domestically (Barrett, 2013). Khan and Ehreth (2003, p. 
705) argues that “From the developed countries’ point of view, providing support for the 
polio program is not simply helping the poor and the disadvantaged, it actually represents a 
good economic investment”. But in spite of the benefits, there have been difficulties of getting 
donor countries to contribute, causing financial gaps and setbacks (Thompson & Tebbens, 
2007). The same behavior was found during smallpox eradication where USA was the 
country that benefited the most from eradication and thus should have fully financed the 
program in endemic countries. However, USA’s contributions was modest compared to the 
needed costs, and the eradication effort depended on contributions from other countries as 
well.  (Barrett 2007). Barrett (2013, p. 8) states that “Financing is a zero sum game - if one 
country pays less, others must pay more”. But even though it may be beneficial to pay for 
free-riding donor countries, they are reluctant to contribute (Barrett 2013).  In order to avoid 
free-riding, donor countries and humanitarian organization puts political pressure on 
governments for making them contribute their “fair share” of costs needed (Barrett, 2004). 
Another way to avoid free-riding is to coordinate contributions. Pirio & Kaufmann, (2010) 
highlights how contribution from G8 countries increased when contributions was coordinated 
by GPEI.  
 
Conveying policy-makers about the importance of using money on vaccination is difficult. As 
Scott C. Ratzan says at a hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, 
Human Rights, and Oversight: 
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[…] what I can say is that some of the fundamental areas that would help make a 
difference would be better communication--and, most particularly, this is political-
level communication--to get the leadership and community-based leaders able to 
understand the value of the polio vaccination. And that has been a very large 
challenge, not only with the anti-vaccine lobby, frankly, here in the United States, but 
really globally, the whole idea of vaccines making a difference in the challenge are 
continuing to be not only for polio but for other vaccine-preventible illnesses.  
(United States, 2010) 
 
For donor countries, the incentives for contributing to vaccination programs in developing 
countries may be low due to a focus on the short term costs rather than the long term benefits 
(Tebbens & Thompson, 2009). Information for policy makers about polio eradication is either 
presented as a way to strengthen health care regarding other countries and thus focusing on 
the short term costs (Obama, 2010; Pirio & Kaufmann, 2010; USAID, 2010). Or, it is 
presented as a good investment regarding its own country’s self-interest of not needing to use 
money on domestic vaccination after eradication and thus focusing on the long-term benefits 
(Global eradication of polio and measles, 1999; GPEI, 2011; United States, 2010).  
 
Disease eradication is a public good game where contributing money up to a certain threshold 
will cause rewards for every subjects. Thresholds used in classic public good games are 
typically fixed (Cadsby & Maynes, 1999). Using polio eradication in a public good game 
creates a threshold of zero cases which is affected by the amount of contribution made. 
Delaying eradication by making small contributions leads to outbreaks and the threshold will 
be more expensive to reach than if efforts were made from the start. Using a dynamic 
threshold rather than a fixed allows us to investigate how people understand and manage 
complex systems. Laboratory studies of controlling complex systems shows that people are 
lacking the sense of time, focusing on the short term rather than the long term and do not 
understand exponential growth. The complexity of the tasks lead in many cases to either a 
vagabond or encystment behavior: either drifting their strategy or sticking to a few variables 
and ignoring others (Davies & Logie, 1993).  
 
For this experiment, we have built a public good game with a two level factorial design where 
subjects either play the role as the policy maker for USA or as the policy maker for the group 
 Disease eradication and the challenges of global resource mobilization 
  
 
 
4 
 
of USA, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and Canada (these two treatments are hereafter 
called “country A” and “group A”). Subjects are given one out of two information treatments 
with either a focus on eradication in the interest of health benefit for endemic countries or on 
self-interest benefits of eradication (these two treatments are hereafter called “other-
regarding” and “self-regarding”). The task is to contribute money to vaccination in the last 
polio endemic countries for a 20 year period with the goal of maximizing country A’s or 
group A’s benefit for a 70 year period. In reality, these 5 countries are not the only 
contributors to vaccination in endemic countries, but they constitute one third of GPEI’s 
budget, which is about the same amount of contributions given to endemic countries (GPEI, 
2012; 2013a).  
 
The purpose of the experiment is to answer three research questions: Firstly, is contributions 
made by subjects affected by contribution given by other countries? We hypothesize that 
making decisions as country A leads to lower contribution and longer time to eradicate than 
making decision as group A. Here, we test if and in what extent country A will choose to free-
ride on others countries contribution (Barrett, 2013). Secondly, does information have an 
effect on performance? Jolly (2004, p. 82) states that “Better is to frame global goals in ways 
that maximize their benefits and minimize their costs”. Policy makers take decisions based on 
their own self-interest rather than regarding other countries (Jolly, 2004). We hypothesize that 
participants given information about the benefit of eradication for their own countries (self-
regarding), will have higher contribution and faster eradication than participants given 
information where the benefit of eradication is related to endemic countries (other-regarding). 
Thirdly, is the effect of information different from group A than country A? We hypothesize 
that country A will mainly focus on comparing their contributions to the other countries’ and 
are therefore less affected by information than group A. 
 
The next chapter explains the underlying model used for the experiment. Chapter 3 describes 
differences between the four treatments and how the experiment was conducted. Chapter 4 
and 5 reveals and discuss the results. We found a weak difference between group A and 
country A comparing how much they were willing to increase their contribution compared to 
the expert recommended increase. Country A is willing to increase their contribution below 
90% of group A’s increase, which is quite high considering that there were 4 other countries 
to share the increase. Information did not have any effect on the performance. Little 
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differences between the treatments might be explained by that the benefits of eradication are 
difficult to understand even with information emphasizing it. Using students to represent 
policy makers’ opinion may also be problematic. Lastly, the paper makes some concluding 
remarks and suggestions for further research.    
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2. Methodology  
 
The complexity of infectious diseases makes it difficult to predict how an epidemic will 
behave (Nokes & Anderson, 1988). Misunderstandings like expecting the number of 
infections to have a 50% reduction if 50% of the population is vaccinated, reveals the need for 
a framework for analyzing infectious diseases (Nokes & Anderson, 1988). Mathematical 
models of infectious diseases have a long history of aiding decision makers from the first 
Kermack-McKendrick model in the 1920’s which serves as the building block for modeling 
epidemics (Kermack & McKendrick, 1927). System Dynamics is used as a method of 
modelling the SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Recovered) model with vaccination. System 
Dynamics use stocks and flows to calculate accumulations and has been used in SIR 
modelling (Sterman, 2000, Thompson & Tebbens, 2008).  
 
The dynamics of infectious disease modeling comes from the idea that the rate of infections is 
affected by the fraction of infected and susceptibles of the population (figure 2.1): The higher 
the fraction of infecteds, the higher the likelihood is for a susceptible to meet an infected and 
thus get infected. This reinforcing loop (contagion) depletes the stock of susceptibles. The 
exponential growth of infectious diseases will be decreased when there are only a little 
amount of susceptibles left causing an S-shaped behavior. The stock of infecteds decreases by 
recovery. Recovered is the accumulation of recovered infecteds and in this experiment also 
people who are successfully vaccinated. The following section describes the SIR model with 
vaccination. All costs used in the model are inflated to 2013 level using inflation calculator 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). 
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Figure 2.1 Suceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model (Sterman, 2000, figure 9-5, reprinted 
with permission) 
 
Modeling description 
In the following part we will describe how the model is build and assumptions done to make a 
simple model with a realistic behavior. The model and experimental game was built using the 
simulation software iThink 10.0.5. We will first describe the SIR model which is much the 
same as in figure 2.1, we will then continue with explaining vaccination and contribution 
structure. All model equations are listed in appendix A.                  
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Figure 2.2 SIR model with vaccination 
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SIR model 
The SIR model describes how susceptible people get infected and eventually recovers. 
Vaccination structures are explained in the next section. All population stocks decrease by 
multiplying the stock with the same fractional death rate of 0.02, assuming a constant 
population. Susceptibles individuals under 5 are accumulated by Susceptibles births: 
 
Susceptible births 
=Births - Routine immunization - Recipient vaccine derived infection 
 
Where Births is, assuming a constant population, Fractional birth rate of 0.02 multiplied with 
Population.  
 
Aging =  
Susceptibles individuals under 5 / Aging time 
 
After an aging time of 5 years Susceptible individuals under 5 enters Susceptible individuals 
above 5. The infection flow is the same for both susceptible stocks:  
 
Infection under 5= 
IF Susceptible individuals under 5 * Force of infection 
* (Infected individuals / Population)  
< 1 THEN 0 ELSE 
Susceptible individuals under 5 * Force of infection  
* (Infected individuals / Population) 
 
The Force of infection is derived from the basic reproduction number (R°), fractional death 
rate and Average duration of infectivity. R° is a measure of how many infectious contacts an 
infected person has in a totally susceptible population within one year. The force of infection 
is an estimation of the number of infectious contacts an infected can have, in a totally 
susceptible population, during his infectious period. (Keeling & Rohani, 2008). Polio has an 
R° of 6. (Anderson & May, 1982)  
 
Force of infection = 
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 R° * (fractional death rate + (1 / Average duration on infectivity)  
 
How many people one person can infect is decided by the number of infecteds in the 
population (Infected individuals / Population). Multiplying by the stock of susceptible assess 
the likelihood than an infectious contact is done with a susceptible. The equation leads to 
exponential decay, and thus the number of infections will never reach zero and unrealistically 
never eradicate since we do not have any stochastic factors in the model.  In order to make 
eradication possible, the number of infections will go to zero if less than 1 person gets 
infected.    
  
Recovery = 
 Infected individuals / Average duration of infectivity 
 
Average duration of infectivity is 35 days (Tebbens et. al., 2005). Vaccine derived infection 
recovery use the same duration of infectivity. 
 
Vaccination 
There are two types of polio vaccine; the oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) given by oral drops 
and the inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) given by injection. The OPV consists of live 
attenuated poliovirus which may cause vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV). 1 in 200 infected 
with vaccine-derived poliovirus develops vaccine-associated paralytic polio (VAPP) (Wringe 
et. al., 2008). Because of the risk of VAPP, it is impossible to eradicate polio using OPV 
vaccination but since the OPV vaccine is considerably cheaper and easier to administer than 
IPV, it is widely used in developing countries.  
 
There are three different polioviruses; 1, 2 and 3. IPV protects against all 3 types, but the 
three OPV vaccines aims at different combination of polioviruses: Trivalent (tOPV) gives 
immunity against all 3 polioviruses; monovalent (mOPV) gives immunity against either 
poliovirus 1, 2 or 3 and bOPV gives immunity against poliovirus 1 and 3 (Sutter et. al., 2010). 
Costs and efficacy estimations reflects using a combination of these types. 
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Vaccination is given by either routine immunization at birth or as a supplement immunization 
activity for children younger than 5 years (Tebbens et. al., 2006).  Supplement immunization 
activities consists of 4 national immunization days (NID) and 4 regional immunization days 
(RID) (aimed at 50% of children under 5 years) per year where children get one dose of OPV. 
This is equivalent to recent programs for endemic countries (GPEI, 2012). In the model, only 
Susceptible individuals under 5 years participate in Supplement immunization activity 
whereas in reality, children are immunized regardless of previous infections or vaccination. 
The costs of Supplement immunization activity use therefor the total number for children 
under 5 years in the population as the target group. 
 
 In routine immunization, a child receives 3 doses at birth which is a simplification of the real 
vaccination program where 3 doses are given in separate doses during the child’s first year. 3 
doses of OPV are used as the routine vaccination policy for vaccination rate up to 80%. 
Above 80%, one dose of IPV and two doses of bOPV are used. Inclusion of one dose of IPV 
in routine immunization is a part of eradicating type 2 poliovirus, but the shift in vaccination 
policy is in reality set to a date rather than a certain vaccination rate (UNICEF Supply 
Division, 2013). Since bOPV protects only against poliovirus 1 and 3, hence it will not cause 
VAPP derived from poliovirus 2.  At baseline, the routine vaccination rate is 68% and the 
supplement immunization activity is 80% (Tebbens et. al., 2006; World Health Organization, 
2013, July). The relationship between them is fixed so that supplement immunization rate is 
17% higher than routine vaccination rate.   
 
We estimate an OPV costs of 0.13 US$2013 (Rodríguez-Álvarez et. al., 2013). The IPV cost 
is difficult to estimate since it is used mainly by high income countries. A global switch from 
OPV to IPV will most likely cause the price to decline drastically. In this model, an IPV cost 
of 1.3 US$2013 is used (Tebbens et. al., 2006). To give a realistic perspective of actual costs, 
there are several unvaccination costs to consider like equipment, personnel, training, 
monitoring and surveillance, transportation, cold chain, building and social mobilization. 
Tebbens and colleagues (2006) estimations of unvaccination costs is used with a 60% 
increase to reflect the real vaccination costs in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nigeria (GPEI, 
2011; GPEI, 2012), corresponding to the baseline vaccination rates. Unvaccination costs per 
OPV dose in routine immunization is 1.376 US$2013, for one dose OPV in supplement 
immunization activity it is 0.96 US$2013 and unvaccination costs per dose IPV is 2.608 
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US$2013. In addition we have included a wastage factor of 20% for OPV and 10% for IPV 
(Tebbens et. al., 2006). This generates a total supplement immunization cost per dose of 
1.1095 US$2013, 3 doses OPV costs 4.596 US$2013, a combination of one dose IPV and two 
doses OPV costs 7.102 US$2013 and 2 doses IPV costs 8.076 US$2013. 
 
Unvaccination costs are derived from studies of low-income countries with average 
vaccination coverage of three doses of OPV of 68 % (Tebbens et. al., 2006). As the 
vaccination coverage increases, using a fixed cost per dose may be unrealistic. Several studies 
have investigated the cost of scaling up vaccination rate (Barett & Hoel, 2007; Bishai et. al., 
2010; Chee et al., 2007; England et. al., 2001; Johns & Baltussen, 2004; Johns & Torres, 
2005; Levin et. al., 2011; Measham et. al., 2006; Walker et al., 2004). Findings from these 
studies conclude that the cost per dose increase concurrently with an increasing vaccination 
rate because of challenges of vaccinating hard-to-reach people. Levin and colleagues (2011) 
estimations of variations in cost per dose are used in the model: Using 60% vaccination rate 
as a baseline, we add an additional cost of 0.06 US$2013 per additional percent vaccination 
rate increase. Coverage above 80% adds 0.13 US$2013 per additional percentage increase. 
Assuming a baseline supplement immunization rate at 80%, 0.06 US$2013 is added per 
additional percentage increase above 80% and up to 100%.  
 
Efficacy of OPV vaccination variates according to vaccine type, number of doses and 
environmental factors. In temperate climates the efficacy after three doses is 95% whereas in 
some parts of India, ten doses are required to obtain the same immunity (Grassly, 2007). One 
dose tOPV in low income country has an efficacy of 45% (Tebbens et. al., 2005)  However in 
endemic countries, efficacy is much lower (Grassly et. al., 2006; Mangal et. al., 2014; 
O'Reilly et al., 2012). Estimated efficacy is based on literature above reflecting different OPV 
vaccine types against different poliovirus with the following rates: per dose OPV efficacy at 
30% and OPV efficacy after three doses at 60%. It is unknown what the effect of combining 
bOPV and IPV is in developing countries with low OPV efficacy, although it will for sure 
increase the efficacy (Jehan et. al., 2013). The combination of one dose IPV and 2 doses 
bOPV is in the model estimated to be 80%. Two doses of IPV has an efficacy of 90% (Bonnet 
& Dutta, 2008) 
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The risk of getting VAPP is 1 in 4.1 million doses OPV (Kohler et. al., 2002).  Similar to the 
wild poliovirus, the vaccine associated poliovirus will only cause VAPP in 1 in 200 infecteds 
(Wringe et. al., 2008). Estívariz and colleagues (2007) states that the force of infection of 
vaccine derived infecteds is the same as for wild poliovvirus, investigating an outbreak in 
Indonesia. However, Kim and colleagues (2007)  shows that there are 7 VAPP cases per 
million birth cohorts in India, a country more comparable to polio endemic countires 
conserdering environmental factors. Using the same ratio of paralytic polio cases per people 
with poliovirus (1/200) and same force of infection for persons with VDPV as wild poliovirus 
in the model, gave much more than 7 VAPP cases per million birth cohort with baseline 
vacciantion rates. The force of infection for vaccine derived poliovirus is therefor reduced to 
88% of the wild poliovirus force of infections, which gives approximatley the same rate of 
VAPP incidence as in Kim and collegues research (2007).   
 
In addition to vaccination costs, there is acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance for 
detecting poliovirus. Surveillance is crucial for identifying the real number of paralytic polio 
cases and is necessary to use in order to reach certification. The AFP surveillance is an 
annually cost per child under 15 years of 0.09 US$2013 (Tebbens & Thompson, 2006). 
 
In order to eradicate polio, there must be a shift from the use of OPV to IPV, which is 
proposed to happen once polio has reached global certification. Certification means that the 
incidence of wild poliovirus has been zero for three consecutive years (Khan, 2008). To 
model this transition we accumulate the years where perceived incidence is less than 1 in the 
stock Years until certification. Counting years to certification is the same as Start counting 
years to certification. 
 
Start counting years to certification = 
IF Perceived incidence < 1  
THEN 1  
ELSE 0 
 
If perceived incidence is higher than 1 after the first year until certification is counted, 
certification is disrupted and begins again when perceived incidence is less than 1: 
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Disruption of years until certification = 
IF Start counting years to certification = 0  
THEN Years until certification  
ELSE 0 
 
Post eradication is the period from certification to vaccination cessation. The vaccination 
costs will be significantly lower during post eradication since supplement immunization 
activities is stopped and the only vaccination is two dose of IPV in routine immunization 
(GPEI, 2009; Tebbens et. al., 2006). Estimating when vaccination can cease is complicated 
(Wood et. al., 2000). In this model we estimate that an IPV vaccination rate at 100% will be 
necessary for 7 years after certification before polio vaccination can be stopped. In the model, 
post eradication starts when Years until certification is more than 3: 
 
Start post eradication = 
IF Years until certification > 3  
THEN 1  
ELSE 0 
 
The number of post eradication years is then counted. Contributions and vaccination rates are 
stopped when Years of post eradication is more than 7 years: 
 
Counting post eradication years =  
IF Start post eradication = 0  
THEN 0  
ELSE 1 
 
People who are successfully immunized at birth enter the stock of Removed individuals by 
Routine immunization. During post eradication, the Post eradication routine vaccination rate 
is constant 100% and using only IPV vaccination results in no probability of vaccine derived 
infection: 
 
Routine immunization = 
IF Start post eradication = 0  
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THEN (Routine vaccination rate * Births * Efficacy) -  Births * Probability of vaccine 
derived infection 
ELSE Births * Post eradication routine vaccination rate * Post eradication efficacy 
 
People who are successfully immunized on a national immunization day (NID) or regional 
immunization day (RID) enters the stock of Removed individuals. A PULSE function is used 
to resemble the short time immunization days lasts: 
 
Supplement immunization activity = 
(IF Start post eradication = 0  
THEN PULSE((Susceptibles individuals_under 5 * 
Supplement vaccination rate * Supplement immunization activity efficacy) 
 - 
(Susceptibles individuals under 5 * Supplement vaccination rate * Probability of 
vaccine derived infection after one dose) , 0 , Supplement immunization activity 
schedule NID) 
+ 
PULSE(((Susceptibles individuals under 5 * Target group fraction on regional 
immunization day) * Supplement vaccination rate * Supplement immunization activity 
efficacy) 
- 
(Susceptibles individuals under 5 * Target group fraction on regional 
immunization_day * Supplement vaccination rate * Probability of vaccine derived 
infection after one dose) , 0.25 , Supplement immunization activity schedule RID) 
ELSE 0) 
 
OPV vaccination gives a Probability of vaccine derived infection. The risk is higher for 
routine vaccinated since they receive multiple doses. Recipient vaccine derived infection 
means those who get vaccine associated infection directly from vaccine.  Both people getting 
infected by the vaccine or is infected by vaccine-derived infecteds, enters the stock Vaccine 
derived infected individuals which depletes by the same recovery time as Infected individuals, 
but because certification use wild poliovirus as a measurement, it is important to distinguish 
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these two. Births subtracts both newborns who either are successfully vaccinated and 
newborns who get vaccine derived infection due to OPV. 
 
Recipient vaccine derived infection = 
IF Start_post_eradication = 0  
THEN PULSE (Susceptibles individuals under 5 * Supplement vaccination rate * 
Probability of vaccine derived infection after one dose , 0 , Supplement immunization 
activity schedule_NID) 
+ 
PULSE (Susceptibles individuals under 5 * Target group fraction on regional 
immunization day * Supplement vaccination rate * Probability of vaccine derived 
infection after one dose , 0.25 , Supplement immunization activity schedule RID) 
+ 
(Births * Probability of vaccine derived infection * Routine vaccination rate) 
ELSE 0 
 
Perceived incidence is the sum of infection under 5 years and infection above 5 years with a 
one year delay to represent both the time to get information about incidences and the time to 
initialize new vaccination policies (Tebbens & Thompson, 2009).  
 
Baseline budget is 318 million US$2013. Acute Flaccid Paralysis surveillance cost per year 
is the first cost to be subtracted from contributions. Inclusion of full financed AFP is 
important in order to detect all incidences. Normalized vaccination budget affects probability 
of vaccine derived infection, Efficacy, Supplement vaccination rate, and Routine vaccination 
rate in graph functions explained in appendix B. 
 
Normalized vaccination budget = 
(Contributions from all countries including vaccination cease - Acute Flaccid 
Paralysis surveillance cost per year) / Baseline budget 
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Contributions 
In the experiment, contributions are either given as individual donor countries with USA 
(country A), Canada (country B), Germany (country C), Japan (country D) and United 
Kingdom (country E) in country A treatment. Or as all donor countries as one group, in group 
A treatment.  The countries chosen are the countries with the highest contributions to polio 
eradication (GPEI 2013a). In the following section I will first describe the country A structure 
and secondly the group A structure.  
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Figure 2.3 All individual countries (country A, B, C, D and E) expenditures 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the stock and flow model of the country A structure. Domestic vaccination 
costs, “v” in model, are fixed and are described in appendix C.  Contributions from country B, 
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C, D and E are derived from using the fraction of contributions given from 1985-2012 of the 
total amount of contributions from all 5 countries in the same years. The amount is divided in 
two where one part is fixed and the other part has a variation where the amount is multiplied 
with a random number between 0 and 2. This reflects the randomness of historical 
contributions (GPEI, 2013a).  Graph functions used for the country B, C, D and E 
contribution are described in appendix D.  
 
With the exception of that country A contribution is decided by the subjects, all other 
equations is the same for all countries: 
 
Annual United States costs =  
IF Years of post eradication > 7 
THEN 0 
ELSE (Country A v + Country A c with post eradication) * Discount factor  
 
After 7 years of post eradication, all vaccination is ceased. The donor countries’ costs are the 
sum of domestic vaccination costs and contributions to polio vaccination in endemic 
countries. All costs are discounted at 3% (Weinstein et. al., 1996). Post eradication 
contributions are not decided by subjects. For every country, the post eradication budget is 
divided between the countries with the same fraction used for country B, C, D and E 
contributions with the inclusion of USA (country A) calculated in the same manner as the 
other countires (GPEI, 2013a). Post eradication costs is estimated to be significatly lower than 
the pre-post period (GPEI, 2009). In the model, the costs of post eradication is 88 million 
US$2013. Since the cost is so low, we expect that all countries are willing to contributes in 
this last effort, and therefore leave this out of subjects decisions. In reality, if donor countries 
do not make any contributions during the post eradication period, it is very likely that private 
organizations, which contribution level is the same as the sum of donor countries, would 
cover donor coutries “share” because of the low costs. 
 
Contribution all indivudual countries is the same as Total contributions and is the the sum of 
all the 5 countries’s or group A’s contributions.  
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Figure 2.4 All countries as one (group a) treatment expenditures. 
 
 
In the group A treatment, all domestic vaccination costs and contributions for group A is 
summed up using the same equations as when using individual countries (figure 2.4). 
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Figure 2.5 Long term costs and net benefits. 
 
The simulation runs for 20 years, but in the experiment the subjects’ policies are tested in a 70 
year perspective in order to estimate long term costs and benefits. If subjects do not reach 
vaccination cessation before the end of the simulation, additional vaccination costs are added. 
We assume a future policy where polio is eradicated. Estimations of future costs are made by 
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using a fixed baseline country A contribution of 133 million US$2013 or baseline group A 
contribution of 318 million US$2013 from year 19 until post eradication policy 
implementation. Using different country A contributions from year 0-19 gives a graphical 
function where Infected individuals in year 19 affects the vaccination costs for all countries 
from year 19-69 (Table 2.1).   
 
Table 2.1  Effect of infecteds on future costs 
Infected individuals 
(People at year 19) 
Effects of infecteds on future 
country A costs (million 
US$2013) 
Effects of infecteds on future 
other countries costs (million 
US$2013) 
158 839.85 2 602.54 2 205.03 
844.83 2 235.40 1 844.27 
31.91 1 707.87 1 354.29 
5.62 1 040.80 789.76  
 
There is a possibility of having 0 Infected individuals in year 19, although the Years of post 
eradication is less than 7 years. In order to continue the post eradication policy for 7 years 
also for future vaccination, we estimate the effect of post eradication in year 19 on future 
costs for all countries (Table 2.2).  
 
Long term country A costs = 
IF Years of post eradication > 0  
THEN Effects of post eradication on future country a costs + USA A costs discounted  
ELSE Effects of infected on future country a costs + USA A costs discounted 
 
Long term costs use either future costs linked to Years of post eradication or Infected 
individuals in year 19. Effects for group A costs is the sum of country A and other countries 
effects.   
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Table 2.2 Effect of post eradication on future costs  
Post eradication 
years  
(years at year 19) 
Effects of  post eradication on  
future country a costs  
(million US$2013) 
Effects of post eradication on  
future other countries costs ( 
million US$2013) 
0.8 846.03 632.13  
3.7 466.4 348.50  
5.7 196.41 146.75  
6.9 22.22  16.60  
7 0 0 
 
  
Net benefit is the countries’ or group’s domestic vaccination costs for 70 years minus the sum 
of domestic vaccination costs until vaccination cease and contributions made to endemic 
countries.  
 
The model is simulated with small dt of 0.05 which is necessary considering the short delay 
of Average duration of infectivity (35 days).  
 
Validation 
Models are not a perfect representation of reality and running different tests is important to 
find out if the model can replicate historical trends and also searching for behavioral errors 
and parameter sensitivity (Sterman, 2000).  
 
Initialization 
Population used in the model is the 2011 population in endemic countries (Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and Nigeria (World Bank, 2014). Vaccination costs are estimated on the basis of the 
real birth cohort for endemic countries by multiplying the crude birth rate for low income 
countries by population. Fraction of population under 15 years is used to estimate the AFP 
surveillance cost (World Bank, 2014).   
 
Stocks are simply initialized to an equilibrium level with a perceived incidence of 795 cases, 
meaning a total annually contribution of 161 million dollar. A base of 795 cases is chosen to 
reflect the global 2011 level adjusted for underestimation (CDC, 2012; Tebbens et. al., 2010) 
The number of cases (2011) in the endemic countries is used in the model counts for only half 
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the global amount due to outbreaks in previously endemic countries (CDC, 2012). Since the 
model reflects the only remaining countries with polio, we use the global level of cases in 
2011 as a base to reproduce the global prevalence of polio. Figure 2.6 compares different 
initial values of perceived incidence to the same base contribution policy (318 million 
US$2013). The initial value of perceived incidence do not affect the time it takes to eradicate. 
Using a higher initial value of perceived incidence does not give an unrealistically long time 
to eradicate compared to the real 2011 incidences in endemic countries.  
 
Figure 2.6 Comparing different perceived incidence initialization 
 
Extreme condition tests 
Figure 2.7 shows what happens after 100 years of zero vaccination. Perceived cases of polio 
will oscillate towards the pre-vaccine equilibrium. This equilibrium is consistent with the case 
rate for polio in USA before polio vaccination started in 1955 at about 9 cases per 100 000 
(figure 2.8). 
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Figure2.7 Extreme condition test: No vaccination  
 
 
Figure 2.8 Polio cases in USA from 1932 (Strebel. et. al.,1992, figure 1, reprinted with 
permission) 
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Using OPV after eradication shows the behavior of the vaccine derived poliovirus. In figure 
2.9, there is a 100% OPV vaccination rate after reaching vaccination cessation with IPV in 
year 18 (meaning no new wild polio infections). There are small outbreaks of vaccine derived 
poliovirus with damped oscillations.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.9 Using OPV after eradication  
  
Behavior sensitivity tests  
OPV vaccination efficacy has a large variation and it is difficult to estimate a realistic value. 
Figure 2.10 compares different vaccination efficacies for supplement immunization activity 
using baseline contribution for group A, where 1 is base efficacy of 30%, 2 is 20% and 3 is 
40%. Using a lower efficacy has a greater effect on the time it takes to eradicate than using a 
higher efficacy. With the low efficacy, post eradication starts in year 14. Using base efficacy 
it starts in year 12 and with the higher efficacy, it starts in year 11.  
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Figure 2.10 Comparing different vaccination efficacies 
 
Table 2.3 shows the sensitivity when using different discounting rates to measure net benefit 
for group A. We have used baseline contribution (318 million US$2013).  Higher discounting 
rates means that the cost of vaccinating group A countries for 70 years is so little that the 
benefit of eradication gets less.  
 
Table 2.3 Group A net benefit with different discount rates 
Group A net benefit  
(million US$2013) 
Group A net benefit  
(million US$2013) 
Group A net benefit  
(million US$2013) 
Discount rate 0% Discount rate 3% Discount rate 6% 
                       15 731.13                           2 446.71                          - 784.78 
 
Policy sensitivity 
The lowest annual amount needed to start post eradication before year 19 is 36 million 
US$2013  for country A and 199 million US$2013 for group A. Polio eradication is very 
beneficial for the group of donor countries if post eradication occurs between year 10 and 13 
(table 2.4 and 2.5). Using more money to eradicate sooner is not beneficial.  
 
The best policy for group A treatment is a gradually reduction in contributions from around 
400 million US$2013 to 0 (table 2.11). Gradually reduction gives a faster eradication than the 
baseline at a lower discounted cost. The best solution is therefore to follow the risk of 
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outbreaks; high number of perceived incidence requires more contribution to vaccination to 
avoid outbreaks than if there are few perceived incidence.  
 
Table 2.4 Comparing policies for group A 
Group A contribution 
(million US$2013) 
Group A net benefit (million 
US$2013) 
Post eradication starts 
(year) 
100 -857.81                          After year 19 
200 994.19 19 
Baseline:                          318 2 446.71 11 
400 2 100.24 10 
500 1 600.45 9 
600 866.48 9 
                         (Figure 2.11) 2 827.82 10 
 
 
Figure 2.11 Group A policy with decreasing contribution  
 
In country A treatment, a higher contribution while the contributions from other countries stay 
fixed lead to a low net benefit for country A, but a high net benefit for the sum of other 
countries (table 2.5). This is a situation where other countries are free-riding on country A’s 
contributions. The opposite happens when country A contributes less than baseline and 
therefore in some extent free-rides on the other countries contributions, although this policy is 
not that beneficial for country A if post eradication occurs after year 19 (table 2.5). The best 
 Disease eradication and the challenges of global resource mobilization 
  
 
 
29 
 
policy for country A is to gradually decrease the contribution and stop them after year 6, 
letting the other countries take the rest of the cost before post eradication (figure 2.12). This 
yields also the highest net benefit although other countries gain more from policies with a 
higher country A contribution. Creating policies that implies free-riding is problematic since 
in reality one countries free-riding will cause other countries to contribute less (Barrett, 2007) 
 
Table 2.5 Comparison of policies for country A and other countries 
Country A 
contribution 
(million US$2013) 
Country A 
net benefit 
Other countries 
net benefit (million 
US$2013) 
Post eradication 
starts (year) 
Sum of Net 
Benefit (million 
US$2013) 
0 1 009.94 -2 165.26        After year 19 -1 155.32 
50 1 866.98 -631.22 17 1 235.76 
100 1 961.76 242.93 13 2 204.69 
Baseline:           133 1 859.62 500.09 11 2 359.71 
200 1 524.58 751.72 10 2 276.30 
300 804.46 863.51 10 1 667.96 
400 190.53 988.93 9 1 179.46 
550 -885.53 1 051.06 9 165.53 
           (figure 2.12) 2 363.74 379.87 12 2 743.61 
 
  
 
Figure 2.12 Group A policy with decreasing contribution 
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Polio eradication is estimated to be certified in 2014; however, the goal is highly unlikely to 
be achieved since there are still incidences both in endemic and non-endemic countries 
(GPEI, 2013b). Using baseline level, this goal is overshot by 8 years. With baseline levels, 
vaccination cease in year 18. We use a 20 year simulation time in order to give subjects the 
chance to reach at least certification. This is done for being able to see subjects’ decisions for 
the whole period before post eradication.  
 
Bondaries 
The model used for the experiment is much simpler than other polio models (Tebbens et. al., 
2005). Compared to other SIR models we have excluded: 
 
- Differenzation of the three polioviruses 
- Multiple age groups 
- Seasonality of force of infection 
- Age adjusted force of infection 
- Case fatality rate 
- Waning immunity 
- Realistic birth and death rates 
- Outbreaks response 
- Extra costs of eradication like global immunization day, surveillance, stockpile, 
destruction of OPV, laboratory costs  (Tebbens et. al., 2006) 
- Latency time  
- Delays beteween the three routine immunization doses 
- Research costs 
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3. Experimental design 
Virtual worlds let the learner try different strategies and to compare them according to the 
feedback received (Sterman, 2000). Using a computer simulated virtual world allows us to 
compare the effect different treatments have on the performance of the simulation. In this 
experiment we have used 4 treatments as a two level factorial design (table 3.1): Other-
regarding and self-regarding are information treatments emphasizing either the responsibility 
of strengthen health services in endemic countries or the net benefit for the country or group 
the subject are playing. Group A means being the policy maker for a group of 5 donor 
countries. In country A, the subjects are the policy maker for country A and get information 
about contributions from the four other donor countries.  
 
Table 3.1 Two level factorial design presentation of treatments 
Group A Country A 
Other-regarding Group 1 (OTGR) Group 3 (OTCO) 
  Self-regarding Group 2 (SEGR) Group 4 (SECO) 
 
32 subjects participated in the experiment, 8 in each group. 15 subjects was in-class recruited 
meaning that the experiment was conducted as a part of a lecture. The rest of the subjects 
were self-recruited via information given during lecture, social media, e-mail and SMS. The 
results from one subject (SECO) was excluded because the participant thought the simulator 
had a test round first.  
 
Task 
In the experiment, the subjects were asked to make annually contributions to vaccination in 
endemic countries for 20 years. Their goal was to maximize its own country or group’s net 
benefit in a 70 year perspective. Both disease and countries were anonymized to avoid 
subjects preexisting knowledge about polio or feelings about donor countries interfere with 
their decisions. In order to increase effort, the subjects with the 5 best results (using net 
benefit as a measure) were in a drawing where the prize was 500 NOK. Treatments were 
randomized. 
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Pre-experiment information 
Before starting the experiment, subjects were told to carefully read a page of information 
(Appendix E). Decision making in a naturalistic context aids performance (Sterman & 
Sweeney, 2002). We have therefore used information derived from sources like GPEI, 
government hearings, CDC and USAID, which are all likely information sources for policy 
makers. One paragraph separated the two information treatments:  
 
Other-regarding (group 1 and 3): 
Funding vaccination in developing countries is a global challenge that requires 
international collaboration. Funding vaccination is an important part of reaching 
UN's millennium development goal of reducing child mortality, which the world 
society is committed to work towards. Vaccination is an effective way for protecting 
children against the deadly and crippling disease X. 
 
Self-regarding (group 2 and 4): 
Global eradication is the most cost-effective and permanent way to protect country A 
against importing disease X. No single country can be safe from disease X until all 
countries are free of the disease and the disease is eradicated. 
 
Group 1 and 3 were given information where vaccination is seen as important for reaching 
UN’s millennium development goal for reducing child mortality and thus focusing on health 
care regarding other countries (Obama, 2010; USAID, 2010). Information in group 2 and 4 
put weight on the benefit of eradication for country A or group A (Global eradication of polio 
and measles, 1999; GPEI, 2011). 
 
The subjects were presented for the amount of contributions given last year (2011) and an 
estimation of increase needed in order to eradicate within 5 years. The real 2011 contributions 
(baseline) are so high that an increase do neither eradicate much faster nor increase the net 
benefit. In order to make a starting point where more effort is needed, we have set last year’s 
contributions lower than baseline in the pre-experiment information. Country A contribution 
was set to 80 instead of 150 million US$2013. The total contributions were set to 230 instead 
 Disease eradication and the challenges of global resource mobilization 
  
 
 
33 
 
of 318 million US$2013. The 2011 level in the graph from GPEI (figure 3.1) was also 
adjusted to make it coherent.   
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Annual expenditures of GPEI 1988-2011 (GPEI, 2012, reprinted with permission) 
 
Missing polio eradication targets have questioned GPEI’s creditability for making financial 
requirements (Pirio & Kaufmann, 2010). In addition to increased requirements following 
financial setbacks, political conflicts, poor vaccine efficacy and higher infectivity than 
expected may also give an impression of a lower financial requirement than actually needed. 
The uncertainty of calculating the real costs needed to eradicate was emphasized in the pre-
experiment information:  
 
Experts have estimated that if the total contribution is increased by 10 million dollars, 
perceived incidence of disease X will decrease to zero after 5 years. However, experts 
have previously miscalculated the cost of immunization due to higher infectivity than 
assumed, poor vaccination efficacy and political conflicts. These difficulties are 
expected to continue.    
 
Using the expert estimated increase, perceived incidence of polio will not reach zero until 
year 10. Subjects were misinformed on purpose to add a level of uncertainty.  
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Information in simulator 
Subjects were presented to a few graphs and numbers to aid their decision making during the 
simulation (Appendix E). Financial resource requirements from GPEI focus on contributions 
needed to eradicate within a set time frame and information about the annual number of polio 
cases. Similar to financial requirements made by GPEI (2009; 2011; 2012), we have not 
included information about the vaccination rates needed to eradicate or percent vaccination 
rate increase costs. Subjects were therefore only informed about perceived incidence at last 
year and contributions for the whole simulation time.  
 
Perceived incidence is a measure of the severity of a disease. By incidence we mean the 
number of new cases (infections) per year (Mathers et. al., 2008). The perceived incidence 
used in the experiment is the true number of incidence with a first order delay with a time 
constant of one year. A one year information delay is used by Tebbens and Thompson (2009), 
in their simulations of policy decisions for disease eradication, to portray both the time it 
takes to receive information about incidences and the time it takes to adjust interventions.  
 
Target group 
The experiment was conducted on System Dynamics student from first and second year 
(master degree) and students taking only some System Dynamics courses. There was also a 
PhD student participating. We used only System Dynamics students in order to get a uniform 
reference group.  
 
Hypotheses  
In order to find out how the benefits of eradication are perceived, we will test the experiment 
results to 6 hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Lack of coordination has a negative effect on post eradication years 
The global management of disease eradication has shown that donor countries are reluctant to 
contribute if other countries do not (Barrett 2007; 2013). The same behavior is seen in 
laboratory experiments where subjects are more absorbed by their self-interest of not 
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contributing more than others rather than cooperation (Cadsby & Maynes, 1999). Hypothesis 
1 ought to find out if we will find the same behavior in this experiment:  
 
 H1ₒ: Group A post eradication years = country A post eradication years 
 
H1ₐ: Group A post eradication years ≠ country A post eradication years 
 
If H1ₒ is rejected, there is an “eradiation game” played between country A and the other 
countries that affect the time it takes to eradicate. Post eradication years count the years from 
certification. We will use post eradication years in year 19 (end of simulation) as a measure of 
the time it takes to eradicate.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Self-interest incentives results in faster eradication than using other-
regarding incentives 
Hypothesis 2 uses the same dependent variable as in hypothesis 1, but here we will compare 
how information affects the time it takes to eradicate. Government decisions are taken purely 
on self-interest (Jolly, 2004). However, policy makers misunderstand how disease eradication 
can be in their self-interest since they tend to focus on short term costs rather than long term 
benefits (Thompson & Tebbens, 2007). 
 
H2ₒ: Others-regarding post eradication years = self-regarding post eradication  
Years 
 
H2ₐ: Others-regarding post eradication years ≠ self-regarding post eradication 
years 
 
By emphasizing (with information) why eradication is the best policy in the country or 
group’s self-interest, we expect the contributions to be higher than emphasizing on others-
regarding arguments. H2ₒ is rejected if information about the incentives to eradicate affects 
post eradication years.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Self-interest incentives result in higher net benefit than using other-
regarding incentives 
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The rationales behind hypothesis 3 are the same as for hypothesis 2: Short term thinking and 
misunderstandings of the benefit of eradication makes the other-regarding group perform 
poorer than self-regarding group.  
 
H3ₒ: Others-regarding net benefit = self-regarding net benefit 
 
H3ₐ: Others-regarding net benefit ≠ self-regarding net benefit 
 
We expect self-interest group to have contributions closer to the optimal than other-regarding 
by contributing more. H3ₒ is rejected if information has an effect on net benefit.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Country A expects the expert recommended increase to be shared by all 
donor countries.  
In hypothesis 4, we investigate how much of the expert recommended increase country A will 
be willing to take compared to group A. The argument behind this is that no countries are 
willing to increase their contribution more than other countries even though it may be more 
beneficial to take the whole increase themselves (Barrett 2007; 2013).  
 
H4ₒ: Group A fraction of expert recommended contributions increase = country 
A fraction of expert recommended contributions increase 
 
H4ₐ: Group A fraction of expert recommended contributions increase ≠ country 
A fraction of expert recommended contributions increase 
 
We will use the fraction of contribution compared to the expert recommended increase the 
first 5 years of the simulation as the dependent variable. Group A’s contribution will therefor 
be the fraction of 240 million US$2013. For country A, we will test the range between 80-90 
million US$2013, where 80 is the base level and 90 includes the total estimated increase 
needed. However the total amount of contribution for country A group will fluctuate because 
of the other countries’ oscillating contributions. This comparison allows us to find out how 
big country A’s assumed “fair share” of the increase is compared to group A. If H4ₒ is 
rejected, country A is less likely to take the whole increase cost themselves compared to 
 Disease eradication and the challenges of global resource mobilization 
  
 
 
37 
 
group A.  The net benefit for country A is higher when financing the whole recommended 
increases themselves than just contributing a fraction of the increase. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Self-regarding incentives result in higher contribution the first 5 years 
than other-regarding incentives. 
In order to test hypothesis 5, we will use the same dependent variable as in hypothesis 4, but 
by using self-regarding and other-regarding as the independent variables:   
 
H5ₒ: Others-regarding fraction of expert recommended contributions increase = 
self-regarding fraction of expert recommended contributions increase 
 
H5ₐ: Others-regarding fraction of expert recommended contributions increase ≠ 
self-regarding fraction of expert recommended contributions increase 
 
The arguments behind this statement are the same as for hypothesis 2: focus on self-interest 
benefit of eradication will lead to higher contributions than a focus on others-regarding (Jolly, 
2004; Thompson & Tebbens, 2007). If H5ₒ is rejected, there is an effect of information on the 
amount contributed.  
 
Hypothesis 6: The effect of information is bigger for group A than country A 
In the last hypothesis we expect the effect of information to be different between group A and 
country A treatments. We assume that country A is so absorbed by finding its “fair share” 
compared to the other countries that an information shift from other-regarding to self-
regarding will have less effect than with group A.   
 
H6ₒ: Effect of information on group A = Effect of information on country A 
 
H6ₐ: Effect of information on group A ≠ Effect of information on country A 
 
If H6ₒ is rejected, group A will have a bigger effect of information shift than country A.  
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4. Results 
 
32 subjects participated in the experiment, 8 persons in each of the 4 treatments.  The result 
from one subject (treatment SECO) was excluded because the person thought the simulator 
included a test run before the real experiment. We used the following dependent variable in 
our analysis: Contributions, post eradication years at year 19 (end of experiment) and net 
benefit. For participants not reaching cessation by year 19 and thus had 0 post eradication 
years at year 19, we simulated the model with their contributions one more time in a longer 
time frame using future policy contributions after year 19. The number of years from year 19 
till post eradication year > 0 is used as negative value and is therefore a measure of the extra 
time to reach cessation.  
 
Figure 4.1 and 4.2 show the annual contributions for the 4 treatments. Post eradication 
contributions are fixed and not decided by subjects and therefore highlighted with yellow 
marking. 28 subjects reached post eradication. 5 subjects reached vaccination cessation before 
year 19; one with treatment SECO, two with OTGR and two with SEGR. Vaccination 
cessation is highlighted with blue marking in figure 4.1 and 4.2.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Contributions: Country A  
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Figure 4.2 Contributions: Group A  
 
Figure 4.3 and 4.4 show the perceived incidence for all subjects. 4 country A subjects 
experienced outbreaks after making very small contributions from the beginning. 7 group A 
subjects experienced enormous outbreaks; the biggest with a top of 133 thousand perceived 
incidences. The difference between outbreak sizes is because in country A, the other 
countries’ contributions will reduce outbreaks. In both cases it takes some time with low 
contributions before the outbreaks.  
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Figure 4.3 Perceived incidence: Country A 
 
Figure 4.4 Perceived incidence: Group A 
 Disease eradication and the challenges of global resource mobilization 
  
 
 
41 
 
Hypothesis 1 
Figure 4.5 shows the descriptive statistics for variables tested. From this result we want to 
find out if there is a significant difference between group A (OTGR and SEGR) and country 
A (OTCO and SECO) using post eradication years in year 19 as the dependent variable. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Hypothesis 1 and 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 4.1 shows the result of Mann-Whitney U test, alpha level .05. The independent variable 
2 is group A and 3 is country A. The test shows that there is no significant difference between 
group A and country A , U(16, 15) = 31, p = .707 (two-tailed test). We accept null hypothesis 
1. 
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Table 4.1 Hypothesis 1: Mann-Whitney U test 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 uses the same descriptive statistics as in figure 4.5 in order to test information 
treatments other-regarding (OTGR and OTCO) against self-regarding (SEGR and SECO) 
using post eradication years in year 19 as the dependent variable. 
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Table 4.2 Hypothesis 2: Mann-Whitney U test 
 
 
Table 4.2 shows the results of the Mann-Whitney U test, alpha level .05. The independent 
variable 0 is self-regarding and 1 is other-regarding. The test shows that there is no significant 
difference between self-regarding and other-regarding, U(15, 16) = 31, p = .812 (two-tailed 
test). We accept null hypothesis 2. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
In hypothesis 3 we want to find out if there is a significant difference between self-regarding 
(SEGR and SECO) and other-regarding (OTGR and OTCO) on the dependent variable net 
benefit. Figure 4.6 shows the descriptive statistics used for testing hypothesis 3.  
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Figure 4.6 Hypothesis 3: Descriptive statistics 
 
Test result of the Mann-Whitney U test, alpha level .05 is shown in table 4.3. The independent 
variable 0 is self-regarding and 1 is other-regarding. The test shows that there is no significant 
difference between self-regarding and other-regarding, U(15, 16) = 31, p = .236 (two-tailed 
test). We accept null hypothesis 3. 
 
Table 4.3 Hypothesis 3: Mann-Whitney U test 
 
Hypothesis 4 
The descriptive statistics for hypothesis 4 is described in figure 4.7. We want to find out if 
there is a significant difference between contribution increase in group A (OTGR and SEGR) 
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and country A (OTCO and SECO). For group A, we compare the contributions the first 5 
years to the whole increase of a total 240 million US$2013 (Contributions/expert 
recommended contributions). For country A, we used a denominator with a range from 80 
(baseline) – 90 million (total increase) US$2013 in order to investigate what country A see as 
a “fair share” of contribution increase compared to group A.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Hypothesis 4 and 5: Descriptive statistics 
 
Test results are shown in table 4.4. We have used a Mann-Whitney U test, alpha level .05. 
The independent variable 2 is group A and 3 is country A. Country A is compared to 89 
million US$2013, which is 90 % of expert recommended increase. The test shows that there is 
a significant difference between group A and country A, U(80, 75) = 155, p = .030 (two-tailed 
test). We reject null hypothesis 4. 
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Table 4.4 Hypothesis 4: Mann-Whitney U test 
  
 
Hypothesis 5 
Descriptive statistics for hypothesis 5 is showed in figure 4.7. In this hypothesis, we want to 
see if there is a significant difference between self-regarding (SEGR and SECO) and other-
regarding (OTGR and OTCO) on the dependent variable fraction of expert suggested amount 
contributed the first 5 years.  
 
Table 4.5 shows the results of using Mann-Whitney U test, alpha level .05. The independent 
variable 0 is self-regarding and 1 is other-regarding. The test shows that there is a not a 
significant difference between self-regarding and other-regarding, U(75, 80) = 155, p = .653 
(two-tailed test). We accept null hypothesis 5. 
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Table 4.5 Hypothesis 5: Mann-Whitney U test 
 
Hypothesis 6 
In hypothesis 6 we want to find out if there is a difference on the effect information have on 
country A and group A using the fraction of base level contribution for the first 5 years as the 
dependent variable. None of the independent variables have normal distribution; hence we 
have transformed the data by ranking them. The ranked values are listed in figure 4.8. 
Ranking resulted in normalized distribution for all independent variables except SEGR, 
which, has p = .044 using Shapiro-Wilk test. We conduct a full-factorial univariate analysis of 
variance even though the criteria for normal distributions are not met. 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Hypothesis 5: Descriptive statistics 
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Test results using a full-factorial univariate analysis of variance, alpha level .05 are shown in 
table 4.6. There is not a significant difference between group A and country A on the effect of 
information (other_self), U(80, 75, 75, 80) = 310, p = .495. We have also used the same test 
with untransformed data and got p = .164. Figure 4.9 describes the lack of interaction on the 
ranked data, where group = 2, country = 3, self-regarding = 0 and other-regarding = 1. 
Country A has a small increase in contribution from self-regarding to other-regarding while 
the effect is nonexistent for group A. However, the high p-value, using both real and ranked 
values and interpretation of descriptive statistics gives us enough information to accept null 
hypothesis 6.  
 
Table 4.6 Hypothesis 6: Full-factorial univariate analysis of variance 
Dependent Variable: Rank of Cont5_base by All_groups_number 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 169.355a 3 56.452 .439 .726 
Intercept 61023.103 1 61023.103 474.021 .000 
GROUP_COUNTRY 60.345 1 60.345 .469 .495 
OTHER_SELF 60.345 1 60.345 .469 .495 
GROUP_COUNTRY * 
OTHER_SELF 
60.345 1 60.345 .469 .495 
Error 19439.000 151 128.735   
Total 81209.000 155    
Corrected Total 19608.355 154    
a. R Squared = .009 (Adjusted R Squared = -.011) 
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Figure 4.9 Hypothesis 6: Interaction plot  
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5. Discussion 
In this section we will examine the results from the experiment and view the results in the 
light of other laboratory studies. We will also relate the results to the polio eradication debate 
and the difficulties of collaboration.  
 
Comparing group A and country A 
We have compared group A and country A in two ways: First in hypothesis 1 where we 
compared how fast the subjects eradicated the disease and secondly in hypothesis 4 where the 
first 5 contributions were compared to the expert recommended increase. In both hypotheses 
we expected country A to contribute less than group A. This assumption is supported by game 
theory in threshold public good arguing that within a group, the members are reluctant to 
contribute more than their “fair share” even though a higher contribution would be more 
beneficial. Barrett (2007; 2013) use the “greed factor” seen when donor countries contribute 
to disease eradication as an explanation of the difficulties of resource mobilization. 
Laboratory studies show also little cooperation between group members when contributing to 
a common threshold of public good (Cadsby & Maynes, 1999).  
 
The results showed no significant difference regarding how fast the disease was eradicated.  
However, there was a significant difference between contribution increases when country A 
contributed 90% or more of group A’s increase. Country A is therefore less willing to take the 
whole increase itself than group A.  Tough the results give us some support for the eradication 
“game”; the connection is weak since what country A considers its “fair share” is quite high 
considering that the burden was shared by 5 countries. The weak difference also explains the 
lack of difference using post eradication years as the dependent variable: Contribution 
increase shortens the time to eradicate, but model testing shows that the effect of contribution 
on post eradication years is low and thus making the difference between the treatments lower.  
 
There are two theories for explaining the little difference between country A and group A: 
First, subjects may be driven by the benefits of eradication rather than adjusting their 
contributions in proportion to other countries. A considerable reduction of the “greed factor” 
is inconsistent with evidence from global resource mobilization. During smallpox eradication, 
policy makers contributed mainly with the insufficient amounts agreed on by the donor 
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countries rather than raising their effort in line with expert estimations emphasizing the need 
for a higher short term cost (Barrett, 2007). This argument leads us to the second theory 
questioning the reliability of explaining real policy maker’s decision with laboratory studies 
performed by students: 
 
Decisions made in the experiment may be more personal motivated rather than focusing on 
the agenda for the policy maker. When subjects in a public good game are more collaborative 
than predicted, it can be explained by social and cultural norms or confusion (Andreoni, 
1995). Giving money to charity is an example of a social and cultural norm where you will 
feel good if you contribute and feel guilty if you are not. Although sanctions feel bigger if 
they come from others, guilt is also experienced when there are no witnesses to your actions 
(Andreoni, 1995). In the experiment, subjects may have contributed more because they may 
interpret the game as an incentive to give money to charity rather than a self-regarding 
investment. Moxnes (2014) investigates the problem of using students to represent the policy 
makers and thus the general public opinion by comparing what climate policies subjects 
prefers. Comparing a group of master students to a balanced sample of the population shows 
that students value long term solutions higher than the general population (Moxnes, 2014). 
Using students in the experiment may therefor give a wrong impression of how disease 
eradication is perceived in the general population.   
 
Policy makers’ decisions are politically motivated. Using smallpox as an example, the 
benefits of eradication was unclear for politicians in donor countries leading to little support 
in favor of eradication. The eradication debate within donor countries was consequently non-
present. One reason for making the goal unclear is that the benefit of eradication only affects 
future generations since the present generation has already been vaccinated. It may be 
difficult to convey voters to be in favor of a policy that would gain future generations and not 
themselves.  Eradication would also destroy local vaccination companies and thus make 
eradication not favorable for a domestic group (Barrett, 2007). This supports an idea that even 
tough contributions are made on behalf of the whole group; they may be smaller than 
anticipated because of misunderstandings of the benefits of eradication.  
 
We are not able to state if the subjects misunderstand the benefit of eradication or not. The 
fact that 28 of 31 subjects reached post eradication within the 19 years may indicate a 
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willingness to eradicate. But subjects may also just “do as they are told” by the expert 
recommendation without constructing their own policy.  
 
Comparing self-regarding and other-regarding  
Hypothesis 2,3 and 5 investigate the difference between two information treatments where 
“self-regarding” focus on the domestic benefit of eradication and “other-regarding” focus on 
the responsibility of giving aid to developing countries. We tested the difference between 
these independent variables using the following depended variables: post eradication years, 
net benefit and contributions relative to expert recommended increase the first 5 years. We 
assumed that subjects motivated by self-interest would eradicate faster, have higher net 
benefit and contribute more money than subjects motivated by others-regarding. In public 
good games, subjects are driven by their self-interest rather than thinking about the other 
actors (Jolly, 2004).  
 
However, the result shows that there is no significant difference between self- and other-
regarding. One reason why there is a lack of difference may be because others-regarding 
framing appeals more to the subjects than self-regarding. Giving money to developing 
countries may feel more important and familiar to the subjects than playing the role as a 
policy maker (Rege & Telle, 2004). Another reason is that the benefit of eradication is 
difficult to explain. Even though they are informed that eradication is the best option, it may 
be difficult to understand that there must be a considerable short term cost in order to enjoy 
the long term benefit (Thompson & Tebbens, 2007).  
 
Effect of information on treatments 
Hypothesis 6 compared the effect of information on country A and group A. We expected that 
the difference between others-regarding and self-regarding would be bigger in group A than 
country A. The rationale behind this argument is that policy makers seem to focus more on 
playing the eradication game with other donor countries rather than grasping the experts’ 
statements of the enormous benefits of eradication (Barrett, 2007). However, the results show 
that the effect of information is the same for group A and country A.  The benefits of 
eradication are therefore equally understood. There are two explanations for this behavior: 
Country A is less concerned by other countries’ contributions than expected and therefore 
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have a bigger understanding of the benefits. It can also be explained by that the benefits of 
eradication is equally misunderstood between country A and group A (Thompson & Tebbens, 
2007).  
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6. Conclusion 
In this experiment, we have investigated how game theory and different ways to portray 
incentives to eradicate affects subjects’ contributions and the time it takes to eradicate. The 
result showed that country A is less willing to increase the total contribution increase 
recommended compared to group A. But the difference is weak since country A is willing to 
contribute up to 90% of the group A’s increase. In spite of the weak differences, the results 
stress the importance of collaboration when mobilizing towards a common threshold of public 
good. Smallpox was eradicated in spite of lack of collaboration .However, smallpox was 
discovered to be technical easier to eradicate than first estimated (Barrett, 2007). Polio 
eradication has proven to be technically more challenging than smallpox, generating a higher 
need for collaboration. In order for polio eradication to succeed, donor countries should 
commit to binding contributions in a mutual agreement.  
 
Conveying policy makers about the importance of eradication might differ from how the 
information is presented. However, in this experiment, stressing the fact that eradication is the 
most cost-effective policy (self-regarding) did neither increase contribution nor give faster 
eradication. The lack of differences between the treatments may be explained by that students 
are driven by different incentives than policy makers. It may also be that students either 
understand the benefit of eradication even though the information does not emphasize it or 
reversely, the benefit of eradication is so difficult to understand that information emphasizing 
it will not have an effect. 
 
For country A, playing against constructed countries is artificial and does not in fully extend 
portray the dynamics of how donor countries affects each other in terms of amount of 
contribution. For further research, we recommend either that other countries’ contributions 
are a fraction of country A’s, or to create a multiplayer game where each subject are in charge 
of their own countries’ contribution. Using a different target group like a sample of the 
general population or policy makers may also give a different result. Subjects could also have 
different explanations of the benefit of eradication in order to find out if there are any 
misperceptions: For example using the eradication of smallpox as an example of the long term 
benefits having short term costs, or letting the subjects do multiple runs to see if learning has 
an effect.  
 
 Disease eradication and the challenges of global resource mobilization 
  
 
 
55 
 
References   
 
Anderson, R. M., & May, R. M. (1982). Directly transmitted infectious diseases: control by 
vaccination. Science, 215(4536), 1053-1060 
 
Andreoni, J. (1995). Cooperation in public-goods experiments: kindness or 
confusion?.  American Economic Review, 85(4), 891-904. 
 
Arita, I., Nakane, M., & Fenner, F. (2006). Is polio eradication realistic?. Science, 312(5775), 
852-854 
 
Barrett, S. (2004). Eradication versus control: the economics of global infectious disease 
policies. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 82(9), 683-688 
 
Barrett, S. (2007). The smallpox eradication game. Public Choice, 130(1-2), 179-207. 
 
Barrett, S. (2013). Economic considerations for the eradication endgame. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 368(1623), 20120149.  
 
Barrett, S., & Hoel, M. (2007). Optimal disease eradication. Environment and Development 
Economics, 12(05), 627-652 
 
Bonnet, M. C., & Dutta, A. (2008). World wide experience with inactivated poliovirus 
vaccine. Vaccine, 26(39), 4978-4983 
 
Bureau of Labor Statistics  (2013). CPI Inflation Calculator. Retrieved November 11, 2013 
from http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm 
 
Cadsby, C. B., & Maynes, E. (1999). Voluntary provision of threshold public goods with 
continuous contributions: experimental evidence. Journal of Public Economics, 71(1), 53-
73.  
 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC. (2012). Progress toward interruption of 
wild poliovirus transmission--worldwide, January 2011-March 2012. MMWR. Morbidity 
and mortality weekly report, 61(19), 353.  
 
Chee, G., His, N., Carlson, K., Chankova, S., & Taylor, P. (2007). Evaluation of the first five 
years of GAVI immunization services support funding. Prepared for the GAVI Alliance. 
Bethesda, MD, Abt Associates Inc 
 
England, S., Loevinsohn, B., Melgaard, B., Kou, U., & Jha, P. (2001). The Evidence Base for 
Interventions to Reduce Mortality from Vaccine-Preventable Diseases in Low and Middle-
Income Countries. CMH Working Paper Series Paper No. WG5 : 10 
 
Estívariz, C. F., Watkins, M. A., Handoko, D., Rusipah, R., Deshpande, J., Rana, B. J., Irawan 
E., Widhiastuti, D., Pallansch, M.A., Thapa, A., & Imari, S. (2008). A large vaccine-
derived poliovirus outbreak on Madura Island—Indonesia, 2005. Journal of Infectious 
Diseases, 197(3), 347-354 
 
Fenner, F., Henderson, D. A., Arita, I., Jezek, Z., & Ladnyi, I. D. (1988). Smallpox and its 
eradication (Vol. 6). Geneva: World Health Organization 
 
Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), (2009): Financial Resource Requirements 2009–
2013: As of January 2009. Geneva: WHO 
 
 
 Disease eradication and the challenges of global resource mobilization 
  
 
 
56 
 
Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), (2011): Financial Resource Requirements 2011–
2012: As of January 2011. Geneva: WHO 
 
Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), (2012): Financial Resource Requirements 2012–
2013: As of October 2012. Geneva: WHO 
 
Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), (2013a) Contributions and Pledges to the Global 
Polio Eradication Initiative, 1985-2015. Retrieved March 12, 2013, from 
http://www.polioeradication.org/Portals/0/Document/Financing/HistoricalContributions.pd
f 
 
Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI),  (2013b). Polio Eradication & Endgame Strategic 
Plan 2013-2018. Retrieved May 12, 2014 from 
http://www.polioeradication.org/Portals/0/Document/Resources/StrategyWork/PEESP_EN
_A4.pdf 
 
Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), (2014a): About us. Retrieved May 9, 2014 
from http://www.polioeradication.org/AboutUs.aspx 
 
Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), (2014b). Polio this week-As of 21 May 2014. 
Retrieved May 28, 2014 from 
http://www.polioeradication.org/dataandmonitoring/poliothisweek.aspx 
 
Grassly, N. C., Fraser, C., Wenger, J., Deshpande, J. M., Sutter, R. W., Heymann, D. L., & 
Aylward, R. B. (2006). New strategies for the elimination of polio from 
India. Science, 314(5802), 1150-1153. 
 
Grassly, N. C., Wenger, J., Durrani, S., Bahl, S., Deshpande, J. M., Sutter, R. W., Heymann, 
D. L., & Aylward, R. B. (2007). Protective efficacy of a monovalent oral type 1 poliovirus 
vaccine: a case-control study. The Lancet, 369(9570), 1356-1362. 
 
Jehan, F., Nisar, M. I., Lassi, Z. S., Omer, S. B., & Zaidi, A. K. (2013). Oral polio vaccine 
plus inactivated polio vaccine versus oral polio vaccine alone for reducing polio in children 
under two years of age. The Cochrane Library 
 
Johns, B., & Baltussen, R. (2004). Accounting for the cost of scaling‐up health 
interventions. Health economics, 13(11), 1117-1124 
 
Johns, B., & Torres, T. T. (2005). Costs of scaling up health interventions: a systematic 
review. Health policy and planning, 20(1), 1-13. 
 
Jolly, R. (2004). Global development goals: the United Nations experience.Journal of Human 
Development, 5(1), 69-95. 
 
Keeling, M. J., & Rohani, P. (2008). Modeling infectious diseases in humans and animals. 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Kermack, M. D., & Mckendrick, A. G. (1927). Contributions to the mathematical theory of 
epidemics. Part I. In Proc. R. Soc. A (Vol. 115, No. 5, pp. 700-721 
 
Khan, M. M. (2008). Economics of polio vaccination in the post-eradication era: Should 
OPV-using countries adopt IPV?. Vaccine, 26(16), 2034-2040. 
 
Khan, M. M., & Ehreth, J. (2003). Costs and benefits of polio eradication: a long-run global 
perspective. Vaccine, 21(7), 702-705. 
 
 Disease eradication and the challenges of global resource mobilization 
  
 
 
57 
 
Kim, S. J., Kim, S. H., Jee, Y. M., & Kim, J. S. (2007). Vaccine-associated paralytic 
poliomyelitis: a case report of flaccid monoparesis after oral polio vaccine. Journal of 
Korean medical science, 22(2), 362-364. 
 
Kohler, K. A., Banerjee, K., Gary Hlady, W., Andrus, J. K., & Sutter, R. W. (2002). Vaccine-
associated paralytic poliomyelitis in India during 1999: decreased risk despite massive use 
of oral polio vaccine. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 80(3), 210-216. 
 
Levin, A., Burgess, C., Garrison, L. P., Bauch, C., Babigumira, J., Simons, E., & Dabbagh, A. 
(2011). Global eradication of measles: an epidemiologic and economic evaluation. Journal 
of Infectious Diseases, 204(suppl 1), S98-S106.  
 
Mangal, T. D., Aylward, R. B., Mwanza, M., Gasasira, A., Abanida, E., Pate, M. A., & 
Grassly, N. C. (2014). Key issues in the persistence of poliomyelitis in Nigeria: a case-
control study. The Lancet Global Health, 2(2), e90-e97. 
 
Mathers, C. D., Fat, D. M., & Boerma, J. T. (2008). The global burden of disease: 2004 
update. World Health Organization 
 
Measham, A. R., Alleyne, G., Mills, A., Musgrove, P., Claeson, M., Jamison, D. T., Evans D. 
B., Breman, J. G., & Jha, P. (2006). Disease control priorities in developing countries. 
Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press. 
 
Moxnes, E. (2014). Discounting, climate and sustainability. Ecological Economics, 102, 158-
166. 
 
O'Reilly, K. M., Durry, E., Quddus, A., Abid, N. M., Mir, T. P., Tangermann, R. H., Aylward 
B. R. & Grassly, N. C. (2012). The effect of mass immunisation campaigns and new oral 
poliovirus vaccines on the incidence of poliomyelitis in Pakistan and Afghanistan, 2001–
11: a retrospective analysis. The Lancet, 380(9840), 491-498. 
 
Nokes, D. J., & Anderson, R. M. (1988). The use of mathematical models in the 
epidemiological study of infectious diseases and in the design of mass immunization 
programmes. Epidemiology and infection, 101(1), 1 
 
Obama, B. (2010). Remarks by the President at the Millennium Development Goals Summit in 
New York, Retrieved May 11, 2014 from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2010/09/22/remarks-president-millennium-development-goals-summit-new-york-
new-york 
 
Pirio, G. A., & Kaufmann, J. (2010). Polio eradication is just over the horizon: the challenges 
of global resource mobilization. Journal of health communication, 15(S1), 66-83. 
 
Rege, M., & Telle, K. (2004). The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation in 
public good situations. Journal of public Economics, 88(7), 1625-1644. 
 
Rodríguez-Álvarez, M., Jiménez-Corona, M. E., Cervantes-Rosales, R., & Ponce de León-
Rosales, S. (2013). Polio Eradication: How Long and How Much to the End?. Archives of 
medical research, 44(5), 401-404. 
 
Smith, J., Leke, R., Adams, A., & Tangermann, R. H. (2004). Certification of polio 
eradication: process and lessons learned. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 82(1), 
24-30. 
 
Sterman, J. (2000). Business dynamics. Irwin-McGraw-Hill 
 
 Disease eradication and the challenges of global resource mobilization 
  
 
 
58 
 
Sterman, J. D., & Sweeney, L. B. (2002). Cloudy skies: assessing public understanding of 
global warming. System Dynamics Review, 18(2), 207-240. 
 
Strebel, P. M., Sutter, R. W., Cochi, S. L., Biellik, R. J., Brink, E. W., Kew, O. M., Pallansch, 
M. A., Orenstein, W. A., & Hinman, A. R. (1992). Epidemiology of poliomyelitis in the 
United States one decade after the last reported case of indigenous wild virus-associated 
disease. Clinical infectious diseases, 14(2), 568-579. 
 
Sutter, R. W., John, T. J., Jain, H., Agarkhedkar, S., Ramanan, P. V., Verma, H., Deshpande, 
J., Singh, A. P., Sreevatsava, M., Malankar, P., Burton, A., Chatterjee, A., Jafari, H.  & 
Aylward, R. B. (2010). Immunogenicity of bivalent types 1 and 3 oral poliovirus vaccine: a 
randomised, double-blind, controlled trial. The Lancet,376(9753), 1682-1688. 
 
 
Tebbens, R. J. D., Pallansch, M. A., Cochi, S. L., Wassilak, S. G., Linkins, J., Sutter, R. W., 
Aylward, B. R.  & Thompson, K. M. (2010). Economic analysis of the global polio 
eradication initiative. Vaccine, 29(2), 334-343. 
 
Tebbens, R. J. D., Pallansch, M. A., Kew, O. M., Cáceres, V. M., Sutter, R. W., & Thompson, 
K. M. (2005). A dynamic model of poliomyelitis outbreaks: learning from the past to help 
inform the future. American Journal of Epidemiology, 162(4), 358-372 
 
Tebbens, R. J. D., Sangrujee, N., & Thompson, K. M. (2006). The costs of future polio risk 
management policies. Risk Analysis, 26(6), 1507-1531 
 
Tebbens, R. J. D., & Thompson, K. M. (2009). Priority shifting and the dynamics of 
managing eradicable infectious diseases. Management Science, 55(4), 650-663 
 
Thompson, K. M., & Tebbens, R. J. D. (2007). Eradication versus control for poliomyelitis: 
an economic analysis. The Lancet, 369(9570), 1363-1371 
 
Thompson, K. M., & Tebbens, R. J. D. (2008). Using system dynamics to develop policies 
that matter: global management of poliomyelitis and beyond. System Dynamics Review, 
24(4), 433-449 
 
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on 
Departments of Labor, & Related Agencies. (1999). Global eradication of polio and 
measles: hearing before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United 
States Senate, One Hundred Fifth Congress, second session, special hearing (Vol. 105, No. 
883). USGPO. 
 
United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on 
International Organizations, Human Rights, & Oversight. (2010). Achieving the United 
Nations Millennium Development Goals: Progress through partnerships: Hearing Before 
the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh 
Congress, Second Session, July 21, 2010, Retrieved May 12, 2014 from 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg57686/html/CHRG-111hhrg57686.htm 
 
UN Population Division (2013, June) Annual number of births (Births), Retrieved February 8, 
2014 from http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=SOWC&f=inID:75#SOWC 
 
UNICEF Supply Division (2013, July) Current OPV Supply & Outlook. Retrieved December 
6, 2013 from http://www.unicef.org/supply/files/Oral_polio_vaccine_update.pdf 
 
 Disease eradication and the challenges of global resource mobilization 
  
 
 
59 
 
USAID (2010, September 20) USAID @ UNGA: Polio Eradication Efforts Spotlighted 
During Summit on Reaching the Millennium Development Goals, Retrieved May 9, 2014 
from http://blog.usaid.gov/2010/09/usaid-unga-polio-eradication-efforts-spotlighted-
during-summit-on-reaching-the-millennium-development-goals/ 
 
Walker, D., Mosqueira, N. R., Penny, M. E., Lanata, C. F., Clark, A. D., Sanderson, C. F. B., 
& Fox-Rushby, J. A. (2004). Variation in the costs of delivering routine immunization 
services in Peru. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 82(9), 676-682. 
 
Weinstein, M. C., Siegel, J. E., Gold, M. R., Kamlet, M. S., & Russell, L. B. (1996). Cost-
effectiveness in health and medicine. New York: Oxford University. 
 
Wood, D. J., Sutter, R. W., & Dowdle, W. R. (2000). Stopping poliovirus vaccination after 
eradication: issues and challenges. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 78(3), 347-
357 
 
World Bank (2014), Population data, Retrieved January 9, 2014 from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL 
 
World Health Assembly. (1988). Global eradication of poliomyelitis by the year 2000: 
Resolution of the 41st World Health Assembly. WHA resolution no. 41.28. World Health 
Organization: Geneva.  
 
World Health Organization (WHO). (2003). Global polio eradication initiative: strategic plan 
2004-2008. Geneva: World Health Organization. 
 
World Health Organization (WHO).  (2013, April). Poliomyelitis Fact Sheet No 114. 
Retrieved November 5, 2013 from 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs114/en/index.html 
 
World Health Organization (WHO). (2013, July). WHO-UNICEF estimates of Pol3 coverage. 
Geneva: WHO. Retrieved January 10, 2014 from 
http://apps.who.int/immunization_monitoring/globalsummary/timeseries/tswucoveragepol
3.html 
 
Wringe, A., Fine, P. E., Sutter, R. W., & Kew, O. M. (2008). Estimating the extent of 
vaccine-derived poliovirus infection. PLoS One, 3(10), e3433. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Disease eradication and the challenges of global resource mobilization 
  
 
 
60 
 
Appendix 
Appendix A: Model equations 
Only equations for group A treatment are listed. The difference between country A and group 
A model is described in the method chapter: In country A model, all the 5 countries have their 
own stock of discounted costs accumulated by a flow of fixed domestic vaccination costs and 
contributions. Contributions of country A is a number between 0 and 550 million US$2013 
and is decided by the subject. Contributions from the other countries are a graph function 
described in appendix D. Post eradication budget is a fixed budget divided by the five 
countries with the following fractions: country A: 0.474697, country B 0.078373, country C: 
0.083806, country D: 0.106945 and country E: 0.256179.  
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Appendix B: Vaccination budget graph functions 
 
Normalized 
vaccination budget 
Routine 
vaccination 
rate 
Supplement 
vaccination rate 
Probability of 
vaccine derived 
infection Efficacy 
0.0000000000 0 0 0 0.00 
0.0145005145 0.01 0.011764706 0.000146341 0.60 
0.0290010289 0.02 0.023529412 0.000146341 0.60 
0.0435015434 0.03 0.035294118 0.000146341 0.60 
0.0580020579 0.04 0.047058824 0.000146341 0.60 
0.0725025723 0.05 0.058823529 0.000146341 0.60 
0.0870030868 0.06 0.070588235 0.000146341 0.60 
0.1015036013 0.07 0.082352941 0.000146341 0.60 
0.1160041158 0.08 0.094117647 0.000146341 0.60 
0.1305046302 0.09 0.105882353 0.000146341 0.60 
0.1450051447 0.1 0.117647059 0.000146341 0.60 
0.1595056592 0.11 0.129411765 0.000146341 0.60 
0.1740061736 0.12 0.141176471 0.000146341 0.60 
0.1885066881 0.13 0.152941176 0.000146341 0.60 
0.2030072026 0.14 0.164705882 0.000146341 0.60 
0.2175077170 0.15 0.176470588 0.000146341 0.60 
0.2320082315 0.16 0.188235294 0.000146341 0.60 
0.2465087460 0.17 0.2 0.000146341 0.60 
0.2610092604 0.18 0.211764706 0.000146341 0.60 
0.2755097749 0.19 0.223529412 0.000146341 0.60 
0.2900102894 0.2 0.235294118 0.000146341 0.60 
0.3045108039 0.21 0.247058823 0.000146341 0.60 
0.3190113183 0.22 0.258823529 0.000146341 0.60 
0.3335118328 0.23 0.270588235 0.000146341 0.60 
0.3480123473 0.24 0.282352941 0.000146341 0.60 
0.3625128617 0.25 0.294117647 0.000146341 0.60 
0.3770133762 0.26 0.305882353 0.000146341 0.60 
0.3915138907 0.27 0.317647059 0.000146341 0.60 
0.4060144051 0.28 0.329411765 0.000146341 0.60 
0.4205149196 0.29 0.341176471 0.000146341 0.60 
0.4350154341 0.3 0.352941176 0.000146341 0.60 
0.4495159486 0.31 0.364705882 0.000146341 0.60 
0.4640164630 0.32 0.376470588 0.000146341 0.60 
0.4785169775 0.33 0.388235294 0.000146341 0.60 
0.4930174920 0.34 0.4 0.000146341 0.60 
0.5075180064 0.35 0.411764706 0.000146341 0.60 
0.5220185209 0.36 0.423529412 0.000146341 0.60 
0.5365190354 0.37 0.435294118 0.000146341 0.60 
0.5510195498 0.38 0.447058823 0.000146341 0.60 
0.5655200643 0.39 0.458823529 0.000146341 0.60 
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0.5800205788 0.4 0.470588235 0.000146341 0.60 
0.5945210932 0.41 0.482352941 0.000146341 0.60 
0.6090216077 0.42 0.494117647 0.000146341 0.60 
0.6235221222 0.43 0.505882353 0.000146341 0.60 
0.6380226367 0.44 0.517647059 0.000146341 0.60 
0.6525231511 0.45 0.529411765 0.000146341 0.60 
0.6670236656 0.46 0.54117647 0.000146341 0.60 
0.6815241801 0.47 0.552941176 0.000146341 0.60 
0.6960246945 0.48 0.564705882 0.000146341 0.60 
0.7105252090 0.49 0.576470588 0.000146341 0.60 
0.7250257235 0.5 0.588235294 0.000146341 0.60 
0.7395262379 0.51 0.6 0.000146341 0.60 
0.7540267524 0.52 0.611764706 0.000146341 0.60 
0.7685272669 0.53 0.623529412 0.000146341 0.60 
0.7830277813 0.54 0.635294118 0.000146341 0.60 
0.7975282958 0.55 0.647058823 0.000146341 0.60 
0.8120288103 0.56 0.658823529 0.000146341 0.60 
0.8265293248 0.57 0.670588235 0.000146341 0.60 
0.8410298392 0.58 0.682352941 0.000146341 0.60 
0.8555303537 0.59 0.694117647 0.000146341 0.60 
0.8713999874 0.6 0.705882353 0.000146341 0.60 
0.8873152584 0.61 0.717647059 0.000146341 0.60 
0.9032761667 0.62 0.729411765 0.000146341 0.60 
0.9192827123 0.63 0.74117647 0.000146341 0.60 
0.9353348952 0.64 0.752941176 0.000146341 0.60 
0.9514327155 0.65 0.764705882 0.000146341 0.60 
0.9675761730 0.66 0.776470588 0.000146341 0.60 
0.9837652678 0.67 0.788235294 0.000146341 0.60 
1.0000000000 0.68 0.8 0.000146341 0.60 
1.0162803695 0.69 0.811764706 0.000146341 0.60 
1.0326063762 0.7 0.823529412 0.000146341 0.60 
1.0489780203 0.71 0.835294117 0.000146341 0.60 
1.0653953017 0.72 0.847058823 0.000146341 0.60 
1.0818582204 0.73 0.858823529 0.000146341 0.60 
1.0983667764 0.74 0.870588235 0.000146341 0.60 
1.1149209697 0.75 0.882352941 0.000146341 0.60 
1.1578727370 0.76 0.894117647 0.000146341 0.60 
1.2102664959 0.77 0.905882353 0.000146341 0.60 
1.2636254130 0.78 0.917647059 0.000146341 0.60 
1.3179494883 0.79 0.929411765 0.000146341 0.60 
1.4216798902 0.8¹ 0.94117647 0.000140244 0.63 
1.4312104812 0.8¹ 0.94117647 0.000134146 0.65 
1.4407410723 0.8¹ 0.94117647 0.000128049 0.68 
1.4502716633 0.8¹ 0.94117647 0.000121951 0.70 
1.4598022544 0.8¹ 0.94117647 0.000115854 0.73 
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1.4693328454 0.8¹ 0.94117647 0.000109756 0.75 
1.4788634364 0.8¹ 0.94117647 0.000103659 0.78 
1.4883940275 0.8¹ 0.94117647 9.7561E-05 0.80 
1.5482442233 0.81 0.952941176 9.7561E-05 0.80 
1.6091128209 0.82 0.964705882 9.7561E-05 0.80 
1.6709998203 0.83 0.976470588 9.7561E-05 0.80 
1.7339052213 0.84 0.988235294 9.7561E-05 0.80 
1.7978290241 0.85 1 9.7561E-05 0.80 
1.8446145221 0.86 1 9.7561E-05 0.80 
1.8524192623 0.87 1 9.7561E-05 0.80 
1.8603228833 0.88 1 9.7561E-05 0.80 
1.8683253852 0.89 1 9.7561E-05 0.80 
1.8764267679 0.9 1 9.7561E-05 0.80 
1.8846270314 0.91 1 9.7561E-05 0.80 
1.8929261758 0.92 1 9.7561E-05 0.80 
1.9013242010 0.93 1 9.7561E-05 0.80 
1.9098211070 0.94 1 9.7561E-05 0.80 
1.9184168938 0.95 1 9.7561E-05 0.80 
1.9271115615 0.96 1 9.7561E-05 0.80 
1.9359051100 0.97 1 9.7561E-05 0.80 
1.9447975394 0.98 1 9.7561E-05 0.80 
1.9537888496 0.99 1 9.7561E-05 0.80 
1.9628790406 1 1 9.7561E-05 0.80 
 
 
 
 
¹ 
Normalized vaccination 
budget 
3 OPV 
vaccination 
rate 
1 IPV, 2 OPV 
vaccination rate 
1.4216798902 0.7 0.1 
1.4312104812 0.6 0.2 
1.4407410723 0.5 0.3 
1.4502716633 0.4 0.4 
1.4598022544 0.3 0.5 
1.4693328454 0.2 0.6 
1.4788634364 0.1 0.7 
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Appendix C: Domestic vaccination costs for donor countries 
 
United States  
(country A) 
United 
Kingdom 
(country E) 
Japan (country 
D) 
Births 2011² 4322000 761000 1073000 
3 IPV cost per dose in combination 
vaccine US$2013³ 12,95 12,95 12,95 
Unvaccination costs US$2013³ 3,1067 3,1067 3,1067 
Wastage ³ 0,05 0,05 0,05 
Doses 3 3 3 
Immunization coverage³ 0,94 0,94 0,94 
Cost per polio immunized child³  50,1126 50,1126 50,1126 
Population 2011⁴ 311587816 62752472 127817277 
Proportion of population under 15 
2011⁴ 19,73 17,54 13,20 
Population under 15  61480018,8 11008754,27 16870172,56 
AFP cost per child US$2013³ 0,4 0,4 0,4 
AFP cost US$2013 24592007,52 4403501,71 6748069,023 
Annual vaccination cost  203591457,8 35847547,28 50544570,61 
 
 
 
Germany 
(country C) 
Canada  (country B) 
 
Births 2011² 699000 388000 
3 IPV cost per dose in combination vaccine 
US$2013³ 12,95 12,95 
Unvaccination costs US$2013³ 3,1067 3,1067 
Wastage ³ 0,05 0,05 
Doses 3 3 
Immunization coverage³ 0,94 0,94 
Cost per polio immunized child³  50,1126 50,1126 
Population 2011⁴ 81797673 34483975 
Proportion of population under 15 2011⁴ 13,28 16,39 
Population under 15  10861915,57 5651741,101 
AFP cost per child US$2013³ 0,4 0,4 
AFP cost US$2013 4344766,228 2260696,44 
Annual vaccination cost  32926984,96 18277067,47 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
² UN Population Division 2013 
³ Tebbens et. al., 2006 
⁴ World Bank 2014
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Appendix D: Country B, C, D and E contributions 
Year 
Country B 
contributions 
Country C 
contributions 
Country D 
contributions 
Country E 
contributions 
0 29,929 31,3594 43,2933 43,385 
1 22,5603 28,6897 38,2347 77,7112 
2 29,4807 27,1383 38,4546 44,7589 
3 22,5306 24,4369 19,2015 66,4661 
4 19,1063 14,268 37,2519 67,2959 
5 30,2869 24,203 18,0113 56,891 
6 31,6064 22,5422 45,0361 96,4255 
7 33,9049 32,4905 17,362 114,331 
8 35,7976 21,7861 36,5337 87,8784 
9 31,8119 32,0057 45,9432 42,6337 
10 33,977 30,6739 28,157 74,0083 
11 18,9261 16,2464 45,7377 67,5455 
12 33,4037 33,7068 46,557 86,7509 
13 35,1217 31,3854 47,2195 75,308 
14 34,8931 29,9402 45,3865 90,695 
15 36,2906 38,945 34,6414 118,411 
16 34,0508 22,9623 18,6689 87,751 
17 35,9415 19,7398 38,8074 85,6003 
18 22,0236 36,8284 34,4731 75,3447 
19 32,1705 21,3918 29,5355 91,9467 
20 30,9409 20,2338 38,8429 57,3109 
21 35,0618 18,0667 35,8021 43,4644 
22 13,9486 23,6366 28,1307 70,8028 
23 36,0539 21,0456 29,6788 82,2403 
24 17,6667 36,0096 28,9293 50,4535 
25 26,5828 13,5379 45,7498 86,3885 
26 12,9524 33,458 41,982 112,822 
27 18,2165 15,1292 22,0047 91,4991 
28 30,0017 16,2845 21,8003 92,5807 
29 34,1289 18,602 20,7344 97,6322 
30 14,6287 21,621 45,3035 111,679 
31 25,4473 28,2367 33,6004 117,559 
32 22,7127 22,0418 35,3696 116,542 
33 28,2868 36,5344 43,6181 41,8839 
34 33,5311 15,7332 19,5434 112,926 
35 34,8109 37,255 50,2166 102,655 
36 17,981 19,8962 47,1883 66,9695 
37 13,3774 27,1383 26,9925 46,7935 
38 22,5985 37,3829 49,9313 105,749 
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39 33,0977 22,0357 39,6167 64,5385 
40 30,6447 17,1754 46,6048 106,87 
41 32,8154 36,9545 46,8902 78,0765 
42 24,27 18,1917 26,4707 101,753 
43 30,0805 15,9611 24,6791 96,8155 
44 30,1959 32,5397 27,6558 43,0551 
45 22,2659 22,8133 33,5291 108,418 
46 31,8018 25,3824 36,0912 122,051 
47 15,4332 19,8091 31,5606 60,5053 
48 27,5822 28,9866 20,7752 41,1325 
49 31,0182 33,0105 44,189 119,199 
50 16,7413 38,5683 40,6958 97,8969 
51 14,7843 33,8341 37,3385 60,7922 
52 15,2826 25,0103 26,9455 62,7681 
53 31,5084 39,7793 26,4482 114,356 
54 26,4186 16,3264 22,379 117,897 
55 31,1124 24,0835 19,4513 49,5902 
56 29,7829 30,7579 38,6424 50,9833 
57 30,0782 14,572 32,6068 71,8494 
58 32,1553 32,9508 21,2468 52,9278 
59 26,1114 20,8527 20,6438 80,665 
60 27,8869 14,8721 17,6212 102,615 
61 34,9099 18,72 36,4171 81,4967 
62 19,5063 28,7015 38,1849 92,8936 
63 18,1168 26,9533 42,2844 63,5122 
64 35,4508 27,9091 32,8083 87,6618 
65 21,9205 36,5162 43,1115 106,8 
66 28,383 26,2507 40,1559 89,8719 
67 32,9949 16,23 42,5737 62,2865 
68 36,2525 30,0105 22,7938 55,1831 
69 26,6589 28,9627 17,7842 77,8388 
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Appendix E: Experiment interface 
Group 1: Others regarding, group A (OTGR) 
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Group 2: Self-regarding, group A (SEGR) 
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Group 3: Others regarding, country A (OTCO) 
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Group 4: Self-regarding, country A (SECO) 
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